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COMMENT
WILLS - REVOCATION AND REVIVAL

-

No REVIVAL OF PRIOR

WILL BY REVOCATION OF SUBSEQUENT REVOKING WILL

-

Bailey v. Kennedy, 162 Colo. 135, 425 P.2d 304 (1967).
INTRODUCTION

T

HE distinctive attribute of a will which renders it unique

from other legal instruments which affect property is its
ambulatory quality. As a dispositive document, a will is not
and cannot become operative until the demise of its maker.
Derivative from this notion is the additional characteristic of
revocability.' To be a will, it is imperative that the instrument
2
be revocable.
Revocation, as applied to wills, is "the recalling, annulling,
voiding, or invalidating of a testamentary instrument which,
but for such revocation, would have been given effect as a last
will and testament. '3 Permissible modes of revocation are
prescribed by statute in every state except Tennessee. 4 Typically, a will can be revoked: (1) nonintentionally, by operation
of law when an event occurs (such as marriage of the testator) to which the law attaches the automatic effect of revocation or (2) intentionally, when the testator performs an act to
the document (such as burning or tearing it) or when the testator executes a succeeding document (a new will, codicil, or
other writing).- A subsequent written instrument can revoke
an earlier one in two ways: expressly, by inclusion of a revocatory clause, or impliedly, by virtue of inconsistent provisions. 6
Closely allied to the revocatory feature of wills is what
might be termed its negative correlative, the phenomenon of
revival. As wills may be executed and revoked, so too may
1 "The essential element of revocability follows from the idea that the
will is not meant to create any rights in others or to pass any interest
in the property covered by the will prior to the maker's death." 1
BOWE-PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 1.2 (1960). "This revocable quality of
the will is what is usually meant when it is said that the will is ambulatory." Id. § 5.17.
2
The power of a testator to revoke is of equal stature and importance as the power to make a will in the first place, and
one of the inherent characteristics of a will is its revocability
if it can be shown that the instrument
.... At modern law,...
in question is irrevocable, it is not a will whatever else it

may be.
2 Id. § 21.1.
3 Id.
4 1 P-H WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS SERV.

1007 (1969).

5 McKinlay, Revocation of Wills, 29 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 492 (1957).
6 2 BOwE-PARKER, supra note 1, § 21.33.
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,revoked wills be restored or revived, reassuming their temporarily interrupted legal efficacy. Revival is regulated by statute
in only 31 states.7 Among them and also among the states
which have dealt with the issue solely by case law, many different approaches to the revival question abound. The conflict
of authority associated with revival is nowhere more apparent
than with respect to the question of whether the destruction
of a later revoking will can bring about the revival of a oncerevoked but still undestroyed earlier will.
Through an analysis of Colorado's leading case in this area,
Bailey v. Kennedy," this comment will examine this jurisdiction's position on revival by revocation of a revoking instrument and also explore the intimately related issue of revocation by subsequent will.! The following questions, as they pertain to Colorado, will be considered. If a testator executes a
first will, later a second, and then destroys the second, when he
dies is he testate according to the earlier will or intestate?
Must the second will contain an express clause revoking all
prior wills in order to effect a revocation under the statute?
I.

Bailey v. Kennedy

Morrison Bailey died testate, naming his wife beneficiary of
a testamentary trust and giving her a power of appointment
over the trust qualified by a provision that if she were to die
intestate, then the trust property was to be distributed to his
heirs. Mrs. Bailey executed a will and codicil. She later executed a second will which contained a clause expressly revoking all prior wills. Subsequently, she revoked the later will
by tearing and destroying it. At her death, proponents offered
the first will and codicil for probate. Contestants (Morrison
Bailey's heirs) produced a copy of the second will, proving its
execution though not disputing the fact that it had been revoked by destruction. The trial court found that the later will
had been revQked with the intention of reviving the earlier
will and codicil and admitted these instruments to probate.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the first
will was revoked at the time the second was executed and
that, once revoked, a will can be revived only by republication.
The court remanded the case and ordered that the trust assets
7 1 P-H, supra note 4,
1008.
8 162 Colo. 135, 425 P.2d 304 (1967).
9 The Colorado statute provides for revocation "by some other will or
codicil in writing, or other writing declaring such revocation, executed,
declared and attested as provided in section 153-5-2 [the statute defining
the requisites of a will] ....
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-3 (1963).
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be distributed in keeping with Morrison Bailey's will and the
remainder in accordance with the laws of intestacy.
II. REVAL IN PERSPECTIVE
Revival has proved itself a most perplexing problem for the
courts and legislatures of the last two centuries. Antecedent to
and still coexistent with the Bailey holding is a motley assortment of precedent and statutes on the subject. To appreciate
the Bailey position, therefore, one must view it against the
backdrop of the rather protean past of the revival question.
England furnished the United States a rich legacy on the
issue by formulating no less than three distinct positions with
respect to whether the revocation of a subsequent will revives
an earlier one. 10 At common law, revocation of a revoking will
revives the latest undestroyed will automatically as a matter of
law.11 Resting upon the rule that a will is ambulatory, this
theory asserts that a will which has been revoked prior to the
testator's death can wield no power as a revoking instrument.
The revocation of the second will constitutes a revocation of a
revocation, leaving the earlier document unaffected. 12 A second
case law rule, the ecclesiastical, considers revival a strictly
factual question of the testator's intent at the time the second
instrument was revoked.13 The revocation takes immediate
effect upon execution of the later will. Revival of the first
instrument - at the later will's subsequent revocation - depends upon the available evidence regarding the testator's intentions concerning the earlier will with no presumption for
or against revival. A third position was promulgated by Parlia10 For interesting detailed accounts of the historical evolution of these various positions, see 2

BOWE-PARKER,

supra note 1, §§ 21.49 through 21.56;

Evans, Testamentary Revocation by Subsequent Instrument, 22 Ky.

L.J. 469 (1934); Roberts, The Revival of a Prior by the Revocation of
a Later Will, 48 AM. LAw REG. 505 (1900); Zacharias & Maschinot,
Revocation and Revival of Wills, 25 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 185 (1947).
"Harwood v. Goodright, 1 Cowp. 87, 98 Eng. Rep. 981 (1774); Goodright
v. Glazier, 4 Burr. 2512, 98 Eng. Rep. 317 (1770).

12

A will has no operation, till the death of the testator. This second will never operated: it was only intentional. The testator
changed his intention; and cancelled it. If by making the second, the testator intended to revoke the former, yet that revocation was itself revocable: and he has revoked it.

Goodright v. Glazier, 4 Burr. 2512, 2514, 98 Eng. Rep. 317, 319 (1770).

As several commentators have pointed out, the use of the term "revival"
in this context is technically incorrect. The revocation of the later will
actually prevents the revocation of the former, and that which has
never been revoked is hardly a candidate for "revival." See, e.g.,
Roberts, supra note 10, at 517. One writer suggests that the word
"restoration" would be more appropriate to the common law theory of
revival. Evans, Testamentary Revival, 16 Ky. L.J. 47 n.1 (1927). Another contends that "It would be more logical for these courts to refer
to the prior will as suspended by the subsequent will and reinstated by
cancellation of that [second] will." 46 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 497 n.6 (1946).

13 Usticke v. Bawden, 2 Add. 116, 162 Eng. Rep. 238 (1824).
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ment via the Statute of Wills of 1837.14 This "anti-revival" rule
abrogated both the common law and the ecclesiastical rules and
directed that, once revoked, a will could be revived only by
re-execution or republication in compliance with the statute on
the execution of wills. Although silent as to when a revocation by
subsequent will took effect in time, the statute was soon interpreted to mean that the revocation occurred at the time of
execution of the later instrument. 15 Under this "anti-revival"
view, therefore, a will revoked by the execution of a later will
can regain legal vitality only through re-execution or republication even when the second instrument itself meets rejection
at the hands of the testator.
American jurisdictions, as a group, have historically favored
no single English position on the revival question. Individual
states have selected a preference from among the three rules,
often adding variations." In fact, no fewer than five views of
the issue have been exhibited in this country:
(1) the earlier will is revived ipso facto (common law rule);
(2) the earlier will is revived unless an intention to the contrary appears (common law rule modified by the ecclesiastical
rule); (3) the earlier will is not revived unless reexecuted or
republished (English view after adoption of the Statute of
Victoria [the Statute of Wills of 1837]); (4) the earlier will
is not revived unless intent to revive appears (post-Statute of
Victoria view modified by the ecclesiastical rule); (5) revival
is solely a question of intent (ecclesiastical rule).17

One writer suggests, however, that these five positions are now
only of historical interest because, by case law and statute,
7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict/, c. 26, § 22 (1837).
Major v. Williams, 3 Curt. 432, 163 Eng. Rep. 781 (1843) (by implication). Prior to this case, it was arguable that the Statute of Victoria did
not interfere with the common law rule because it pertained only to
"revoked wills," and according to the common law view, the first will is
never revoked following revocation of a subsequent will prior to the
testator's death. Unrevoked wills merely continue in existence and need
not be republished. However, in holding that the revocation took immediate effect upon execution of a subsequent will, the English courts
effectively rejected that argument.
[T]he question of revival of an earlier will by the destruction or
16
other revocation of a later will is involved in much contradiction and conflict. The courts of different jurisdictions seem to
have taken every conceivable view of the matter ....
Roberts, supra note 10, at 506. Almost 50 years later, the situation had
evinced no discernible improvement:
This survey of judicial decisions dealing with revocation and
revival of wills, even when taken state by state, discloses an
almost kaleidoscopic pattern of confusing factual situations and
legal determinations from which one could draw a parallel case
to fit almost every set of circumstances which human ingenuity
or carelessness could produce or to bolster up an argument on
either side of some particular problem.
Zacharias & Maschinot, Revocation and Revival of Wills, 26 Cm.-KENT
L. REV. 107, 146 (1948).
1763 W. VA. L. REv. 86, 88 (1960) (citation omitted). See generally
Annot., 28 A.L.R. 911 (1924); Annot., 162 A.L.R. 1072 (1946).
14

15
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the jurisdictions adhering to the ecclesiastical rule or one of its
variants (rules 2, 4, and 5) have settled upon a functionally
similar view, denominated the "American Rule," which holds
that a prior will is not revived unless it is clear that the testator intended revival.'8 Given this consolidation, we find that in
the United States today, 29 states follow the hybrid "American
Rule";'! six have remained faithful to the English common law
rule;2 0 and 12 have adopted an "anti-revival" rule modelled
after the English Statute of Wills. 21 Prior to the Bailey case,
Colorado was among the three states which espoused no view
22
with respect to revival.
The English experience and the disparity of opinion relative to the revival question still evident among American jurisdictions reflect the thorny nature of the issue. In seeking a
solution to the problem of how to treat a former will when
a later one is destroyed, the courts and legislatures are faced
with a dilemma. Two conflicting goals, both of which are fundamentally intrinsic to the law of wills, must be reconciled.
The testator's evinced intent must be honored with the utmost
fidelity, while at the same time, statutory safeguards associated with the execution and revocation of wills must be deferred to in the spirit of the Statute of Frauds 23 as expressed in
American statutes. In other words, the strict exclusionary rules
regulating the admissibility of parol evidence in determining
a testator's intent must be heeded while simultaneously attempting to maximize opportunity to arrive at a true finding
of that intent as manifested by him. How the various positions
on revival deal with this tension will be consider following an
examination of the court's reasoning in the instant case.
III.

THE Bailey RATIONALE

Bailey was a case of first impression in Colorado. Having
no revival statute upon which to base its decision, the Colorado
Supreme Court was faced with the competing positions extant
on the issue. In reaching its decision, the court alluded to the
Comment, Revival of Revoked Wills, 19 Wyo. L.J. 223, 228 (1965).
19 states by statute (Ala., Alas., Cal., Idaho, Ind.,
Kan., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.M., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., S.D.,
Utah & Wash.) and 10 states by case law (Iowa, Md., Mass., Minn.,
Neb., N.H., N.J., Tenn., Vt. & Wyo.). Id. at 229 nn.32-36.
20Common law rule: two states by statute (La. & Mich.) and four states
by case law (Conn., Del., R.I. & S.C.). Id. at 229-30 nn37-39.
21 "Anti-revival" rule: 10 states by statute (Ark., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Ill.,
Ky., N.C., Tex., Va. & W. Va.) and two states by case law (Miss. &
Wis.). Id. at 230 nn.40-43.
22 Arizona and Maine, in addition to Colorado, have no position on revival.
Id. at 230.
23 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 22 (1677).
18

19 "American Rule:"
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"notable division of authority '24 on the question of revival by
revocation of revoking will but apparently felt that delineation
of the relative merits of the several views was unwarranted.
The court proceeded directly to its own choice, giving the
impression that it believed that the statute on revocation com25
pelled only one result.
The Colorado statute on revocation of wills provides for
several modes to revoke a will:
A will shall be revoked by, and only by, the subsequent marriage of the testator, or by burning, tearing or obliterating the
will by the testator himself, or in his presence and by his direction and consent, or by some other will or codicil in writing, or
other writing, declaring such revocation, executed, declared and
attested as provided in section 153-5-2 [the statute defining the
requisites of a will] .... 26

By the plain words of the statute ("by, and only by") and by
case law, 27 these are the mandatory and exclusive methods by
which to effect a revocation. Relying on local precedent, 28 the
Bailey court declared that all methods of revocation listed
in the statute are of equal effectiveness when accomplished
coincidental with the necessary intent to revoke. All methods
being equal, any of the statutory modes of revocation must
therefore become operant at precisely the same point in time.
Obviously, when a will is revoked by an act to the document
itself (burning, tearing, or obliterating), such revocation has
immediate physical and legal effect: in whole or in part, the
instrument is literally destroyed. To hold that revocation by
subsequent will does not take effect until the instrument is
admitted to probate, the court reasoned, would yield inequality
among the modes by giving "undue prominence and unwarranted preference" to revocation by act to the document and
thus favor the abusive revocatory forms over revocation by
subsequent instrument. 29 Furthermore, since there is nothing
on the face of the statute to indicate that the modes are to vary
with respect to the time of their operative effect, the court concluded that the legislature intended each method of revocation
Bailey v. Kennedy, 162 Colo. 135, 137, 425 P.2d 304, 305 (1967).
Other courts in jurisdictions with a revocation statute like Colorado's
have reached contrary results. See, e.g., Timberlake v. State-Planters
Bank of Commerce & Trusts, 201 Va. 950, 115 S.E.2d 39 (1961), noted in
10 KAN. L. REV. 106 (1961); 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 166 (1961); 63
W. VA. L. REV. 86 (1960).
26
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-3 (1963).
27 Isenbart v. Johnson, 124 Colo. 436, 238 P.2d 879 (1951).
28 Twilley v. Durkee, 72 Colo. 444, 211 P. 668 (1923); Freeman v. Hart, 61
Colo. 455, 158 P. 305 (1916).
29 162 Colo. at 139, 425 P.2d at 306.
24
25
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to be the equal of the others. 30 Revocation by any statutory
method has present effect at the exact moment it is employed.
By its result, the court held that the execution of a subsequent will containing a revocatory clause constitutes a statutory mode of revocation. This holding was clearly within the
meaning of the plain words of the statute. A will can be
revoked by "some other will," and even if that will must "declare" such revocation (discussed infra), certainly a will having
a clause revoking all previous wills can be said to "declare"
a revocation. Since all modes of revocation are equivalent and
therefore accomplish a revocation at the same instant, the
execution of a second will with a revocatory clause, as a recognized mode of revocation, is tantamount to physical destruction
of the earlier document.
The trial court had embraced the "American Rule" of revival in holding that Mrs. Bailey died testate by her earlier will
and codicil because she had revoked the later will with the
intention of reviving the first. The supreme court rejected
this view and adopted the "anti-revival" rule, holding that once
revoked, a will can be revived only by republication of the
document in compliance with the statute which prescribes the
requisites of a will. In reversing the lower court, the supreme
court called attention to the danger which inheres in the
"American Rule," and clearly intimated in dictum that a doctrine which allows a once-revoked will to regain legal sanction
through parol evidence hazards the twin perils of fraud and
perjury for the reason that, as here, oral evidence as to intent
will frequently be provided by claimants who stand to gain
or lose by the result.3 1 If a Colorado testator intends an earlier
instrument to be revived upon the destruction of a later one
having a revocatory clause, he must manifest that intent with
nothing less than the statutory formalities required to create
it in the first instance. Tolerating less stringent standards regarding manifestation of testamentary intent, the court seems
to say, compromises the statutory safeguards developed to
protect the testation process and invites their breach. In Colorado, only through republication can a revoked will be revived.
IV.

REVIVAL IN CoLORADO

The position on revival settled upon by the Bailey court
derives from abundant authority, conforming with the doctrines
of England and 12 other states in this country.3 2 Inasmuch as
3o Id. at 138-39, 425 P.2d at 306.
31 Id. at 140, 425 P.2d at 306-07.
32

List of states note 21 supra.
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two other views of the matter also have currency in the United
States, a juxtaposition of Bailey with them affords a means
to evaluate the implications of the Colorado decision. The degree to which each view maintains the competing objectives of
faithfulness to the testator's intent and avoidance of the parol
evidence dangers in the probate process is a proper benchmark
by which to gauge their relative merits. 33
The common law rule, accepted in a distinct minority of
states, has elicited much criticism. A classic and cogent repudiation of that rule was expressed in an early Georgia decision
concerned with revival by revocation of a later inconsistent
will:
The case is this: He had a scheme, and abandoned it for another, and thus [then?] abandoned the second.. .. [Clan you...
say that when he abandons the last he returned to the first? If
these two schemes comprehended all the possible dispositions of

his property, then the conclusion would be a logical one ....
But when the number of possible schemes in every case is legion,
you cannot say that because he has departed from any one you
know his mind has settled upon any other particular one out
of that infinite number. The whole fallacy lies in assuming that
the two papers exhaust the subject. It seems to me that the
abandonment of any one scheme does not of itself afford the
least indication in favor of any other particular one out of an
infinite number.34
As this case implies, the common law rule ignores the possibility that the testator intended to die intestate when he revoked the later instrument. With this in mind, one authority
submits that the "anti-revival" rule conforms more closely to
the effect most testators would expect a later revoking will to
have on an earlier one: that a prior will is revoked finally
and forever at the time a second is executed. 35 The prevention
of automatic revival protects against probation of a previous
will which had at one time been rejected by the testator but
retained inadvertently or for records-keeping purposes with the
belief that it was devoid of present or potential legal efficacy.
Another criticism of the common law rule is that it fails
to distinguish between the dispositive and revocatory functions
33

Professor Page has stated that a truly ideal rule in this area is unachievable: "No rule can be worked out which will avoid the dangers of oral
evidence on the one hand and which will give effect to the actual intention of the testator in the particular case, on the other." 2 BOWE-PARKER,

supra note 1, § 21.54. It follows that scme compromise between the two
objectives is inevitable. No rule is completely free from criticism;
therefore, whichever a court chooses as the "best" rule is so in only a
relative, not ideal, sense.
34 Harwell v. Lively, 30 Ga. 315, 320-21, 76 Am. Dec. 649, 651 (1860)
(emphasis added by the Georgia Supreme Court).
35 2 BOWE-PARKER, supra note 1, § 21.54.
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of a will. Although it is undisputed that the dispositive provisions of a will must be considered ambulatory, this argument
contends that revocatory provisions must be given immediate
effect at the time a subsequent will is executed in that a
revocatory clause is not essential to testamentary validity and
should be considered a separate instrument of immediate effect. 36 The same reasoning has also been applied to inconsistency in the subsequent will on the ground that there is no
difference in principle between revocation by express clause
3 7
and by implication.
Although the ecclesiastical rule and its modern variant, the
"American Rule," attempt to avoid distortion of the testator's
intent risked by automatically probating a will about which
only one thing is known for certain-that it was in some
degree expressly or impliedly rejected by the testator-it indulges a greater hazard: the danger of abuse of the entire probate process by allowing oral testimony from interested parties.3
This approach is contrary to the spirit of the Statute of Frauds
in permitting a will once revoked to be restored to legal conse39
quence on the basis of parol evidence alone. 1
The Bailey view on revival avoids the dangers of parol in
determining the validity of a prior will and, in the opinion of
this writer, runs a minimal risk of abusing the testator's intent. 41' When a testator executes a subsequent will it is reasonably safe to assume that in some respect the second instrument
revokes the first. For what other reason would a person execute a second testamentary document if not to change one
U,Note, Destruction of a Subsequent Will as Effecting the Revival of a
Prior Will, 5 TEMPLE L.Q. 614, 622 (1931); 12 COLUM. L. REv. 353, 355
(1912).
37 46 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 498 n.9 (1946). See generally Note, Revival by
of a Revocatory Clause, 28
Revocation of a Later Instrument -Effect
Ky. L.J. 227 (1940).
The courts which have adopted the ecclesiastical law rule ...
38
attempt to do justice by giving effect to the actual intention of
the testator; but they do it by throwing open the gates for oral
evidence of testator's declarations, upon which the validity of
the first will is to depend.
2 BOWE-PARKER, supra note 1, § 21.54. With respect to American statutes
which direct that there is no revival unless it appears by the terms of
the revocation, one authority states that the "prevailing" interpretation
of such statutes is that the phrase, "unless it appears by the terms of the
revocation," applies only to instances of written revocation and that oral
assertions as to intent are not sufficient to revive under a statute of
this type. To the extent that this is true, then no objection can be made
that this position violates the Statute of Frauds. Ferrier, Revival of a
Revoked Will, 28 CAL. L. REV. 265, 266 n.7 (1940).
3) See the report of the committee on revision of New York statutes
(dated 1827-28) as quoted in Ferrier, supra note 38, at 267; 12 COLUM.
L. REv. 353, 355 (1912).
40 But see Ferrier, supra note 38, at 272-75.
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already in existence?" Inconsistency or a revocatory clause in
the second will manifests a disclaimer of the first. In tearing
up the second, the rejection itself is rejected, but the conclusion that by such act the testator automatically intends testacy
by revival of the lirst is only one of many possible intentions.
Further, if the testator desires that the first will be reinstated,
he can do so through republication and thus express his desires
unequivocally and preclude the necessity of establishing his
intent through parol evidence.
Intestacy, established by statute and representing the legislature's accumulated judgment on how the average deceased
person would probably have wished his assets distributed had
he made a will, requires no safeguards.42 Since the first English
Statute of Wills,4 3 the testation process has been closely regulated and guarded through comprehensive statutory controls."
Despite the possibility for denial of a testator's wishes inherent
in the "anti-revival" rule, is it not better to risk distribution of a
testator's property according to the laws of intestacy rather than
to risk an even greater abuse of the estate by allowing oral
evidence to determine distribution when a testator destroys
45
The
a second will, leaving a once-revoked will in existence?
Bailey view refuses to honor any manifestation of a testator's
intent other than those required by statute to create a will in
the first place. To make a will, certain formalities must be met.
To "re-make" a will, the same should hold true.
V.

REVOCATION BY SUBSEQUENT WmL IN COLORADO

Since the second will in the Bailey case contained an express clause revoking all prior wills, the court did not reach
the question of what result would ensue if the later will had no
revocatory clause. 46 This comment will conclude with a con41 It is possible, though extremely improbable, that the second will dupli-

cates the first because, for example, the testator forgot that he had already executed a will previously or he believed that a change in circumstances (such as the birth of a child or a change of residence) required a new testamentary act. However, such possibilities are so remote
that it is more reasonable to assume that the second instrument did
alter the first in some respect. This assumption relates only to the desirability of the "anti-revival" rule as compared to the other two rules,
and it is not suggested that it be accorded the status of a legal presumption.
42 "[T]he law views intestacy as normal and requires no safeguards,
whereas experience has shown the necessity of safeguards around testamentary acts." 32 YALE L.J. 396, 398 (1923).
43 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540).
44 See generally Rees, American Wills Statutes (pts. 1-2), 46 VA. L. REV.
613, 856 (1960).
45Ferrier, supra note 38, at 267; 32 YALE L.J. 396 (1923).
4, One would expect this issue to arise far less frequently than the question of how to treat the effect of the destruction of a second will with
a revocatory clauze because the great bulk of wills are drawn (at least
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sideration of this issue and attempt to answer the question
posed in the introduction: does the execution of a second will
absent a revocatory cause constitute a statutory revocation?
Some American jurisdictions distinguish between the effects of subsequent wills which have and those which do not
have a revocatory clause.' 7 If the second will does contain a
clause, then the revocatory effect is deemed immediate and
final at the execution of the document. The theory underlying
this doctrine is that an express clause of revocation should be
regarded independent from the instrument and hence a statutory revocation at once.4 1 On the other hand, if the second will
is merely inconsistent, then the revoking effect is considered
ambulatory and thus cannot operate unless admitted to probate. This distinction has received a mixed reaction from legal
writers, 49 and the majority of jurisdictions advancing the "antirevival" theory are said to make no distinction, holding that
no revival of an earlier will can be brought about by the
destruction of a later revoking will, regardless of the presence
or absence of a revocatory clause. 50
The Colorado statute on revocation of wills provides for
revocation "by some other will or codicil in writing, or other
writing, declaring such revocation, executed, declared and attested as provided" by the statute on the execution of wills.5
A literal interpretation of the italicized phrase, "declaring such
revocation," would dictate the use of an express revocatory
clause. Does the phrase apply only to "other writing," and not
to "some other will," thus allowing revocation by the mere
execution of a second will without a revocation clause? Or
does the qualification apply to all three listed instruments alike
and thus seem to require that a second will must have an express clause of revocation in order to have revocatory effect?
For at least two reasons, the phrase must be said to apply to all
three. First, the phrase is set off by commas as a participial
phrase in apposition, and as such, it modifies all three nouns
preceding it. A second and more significant indicator may be
those drafted by lawyers) according to a fairly routinized pattern and
include a revccatory clause in the preamble as a matter of course. 7
BOwE-PARKER, supra note 1, at 7; 5 TEMPLE L.Q. 614 (1931).
47 See, e.g., Cheever v. North, 106 Mich. 390, 64 N.W. 455, 37 L.R.A. 561,
58 Am. St. R. 499 (1895); T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS
§ 92 (2d ed. 1953); 2 BOWE-PARKER, supra note 1, § 21.54; 28 Ky. L.J.
227 (1940).
48T. ATKINSON, supra note 47, § 92; 5 TEMPLE L.Q. 614 (1931).
4. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 10, at 520 (approving) and 15 HARV. L. REV.
142 (1901) (disapproving).
50 T. ATKINSON, supra note 47, § 92.
added).
51 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-3 (1963) (emphasis

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 49

gleaned from legislative history. Prior to 1947, the statute read
as follows: a will shall be revoked "by some other will or codicil in writing, declaring the same. '52 In 1947, the state legislature amended the statute to include revocation by an "other
writing," adding it followed by a comma.5 3 In view of the fact
that "declaring the same" (the precursor to the more explicit
present phrase, "declaring such revocation") applied to "will"
and "codicil" originally in the statute, it is reasonable to conclude that it still so applies today.
In light of the fact that the subsequent instrument, whether
it be a will, a codicil, or an other writing, must "declare" a
revocation in order to meet the requirement of the statute, a
literal reading of the statute would seem to indicate that a
subsequent will must have a revocatory clause to accomplish
the nullification of a previous will. Whether a clause is actually necessary will depend upon the meaning the courts are
willing to impute to the phrase "declaring such revocation."
The Colorado Court of Appeals, in In re McKeown, 54 recently construed this section of the statute, and the opinion suggests that Colorado courts will not favor a strict literal reading
of it (that the phrase demands the use of an express clause
of revocation). A testatrix executed a codicil modifying the
first article of her will. Later, she executed a second codicil
inconsistent with the first but which did not contain a revocatory clause, although it did acknowledge the earlier codicil
by general reference to it. Both were admitted to probate, and
counsel argued that the second codicil could not revoke the
first because it was merely inconsistent with the first and did
not expressly "declare" a revocation of it as directed by the
statute. In rejecting this argument, the court held that to effect
a revocation under the statute, the word "revoke" or any form
of it is not obligatory. It was enough that the express wording
of the second codicil was inconsistent with the earlier one. In
effect, the court concluded that inconsistency is a sufficient
"declaration" of revocation to fulfill the requisite of the statute.5
An additional reason to suggest that Colorado courts may
consider the execution of a second inconsistent will absent a
52 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.,

C. 176, § 40 (1935).

53 Ch. 341, § 1, [1947] Colo. Sess. Laws 935.
54 28 Colo. App. 49, 470 P.2d 611 (1970).

55 McKeown is not precisely on point since it dealt with two codicils, both
of which were in existence at the time of probate. However, in the
appaals court's willingness to construe the phrase "declaring such revocati, n" more broadly than a strict literal reading would allow, the case
suggests a direction which might lead to a holding that inconsistency is

sufficient to "declare a revocation" within the meaning of the statute.
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revocatory clause a revocation under the statute is implicit
in the fact that Colorado, as do all American states,50 accedes
in the doctrine of revocation by implication.5 7 Since the revocation statute is mandatory and sets forth the exclusive methods
by which a will can be annulled, one must conclude that
either the courts have acquiesced in allowing this doctrine to
operate contrary to the dictates of the statute or else the
statute is amenable to a construction which permits this type
of revocation. In view of the superiority of constitutionally
valid legislative fiat over the common law, the latter must be
the case.
More compelling support of the idea that the statute can be
construed to allow revocation by implication derives from
Illinois precedent. This issue was faced squarely by the supreme court of that state on more than one occasion, and in
view of the fact that the Colorado statutory enactments on wills
were borrowed from that state, 58 the Illinois decisions are very
persuasive on this point.5 9 The Illinois statute on revocation
provided for revocation "by some other will, testament or
."60 This provision
codicil in writing declaring the same ...
61
to mean that there
cases,
in
two
by
the
court,
was interpreted
could be no revocation by implication in Illinois because to revoke a previous will, a subsequent will must contain an ex62
press revocatory clause. In a third decision, Lasier v. Wright,
the Illinois Supreme Court declared that it had erred in its
intrepretation of the statute expressed in the earlier cases and
held that the statutory language could and did provide for
revocation by implication, reasoning as follows:
When a testator makes a will absolutely inconsistent with all
other wills and declares it his last will and testament, such acts
of necessity amount to a declaration that all former wills are
revoked. The word "declare," as defined by the lexicographers,
means primarily to make known; to make manifest: to make
clear; to present in such a manner as to exemplify; to disclose;
56 2 BowE-PARUER, supra note 1, § 21.1. See generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.
652 (1927); Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 11 (1958).
57 Estate of Lehmer, 144 Colo. 477, 357 P.2d 89 (1960); Whitney
ington, 36 Colo. 407, 85 P. 84 (1906).
58 Keeler v. Trueman, 15 Colo. 143, 25 P. 311 (1890).
59
Colorado is known to have adopted into its realm of statutory
law provisions from the Illinois statutes, and consequently when
the occasion arises, our court frequently gives prime consideration to Illinois precedent when necessary to interpret such a

statutory Provision.

Vandermee v. District Ct., 164 Colo. 117, 121, 433 P.2d 335, 337 (1967).
60 Ch. 148, § 17, [1871-72] Ill. Laws 775.
61 Limbach v. Limbach, 290 Ill. 94, 124 N.E. 859 (1919); Stetson v. Stetson,
200 Ill. 601, 66 N.E. 262 (1903) (dictum).
62

304 Ill. 130, 136 N.E. 545 (1922).
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to reveal. The testator in this case, within the meaning of the
statute, has declared a revocation of his former will by impliedly
saying in every clause thereof that the will he was then executing was his will and his complete and only will. It was not necessary to use express words in terms declaring such revocation.
63
The statute makes no such requirement.

Revocation by implication realized through inconsistent testamentary provisions is, therefore, a "declaration of revocation"
within the meaning of the statute.
Intent is a purely subjective phenomenon of which the law
can take cognizance only as it is objectively manifested
through

overt

behavior.

a

Certainly,

revocatory

clause

is

an

unambiguous expression of intent to revoke prior instruments.
In recognizing revocation by implication, courts also treat inconsistency

revoke.

as a reliable

objective

manifestation

of intent to

Therefore, under the Bailey "anti-revival" rule, if it

can be shown that a testator executed a later will inconsistent
with an earlier one and then destroyed the second leaving the
first, the

testator will be deemed

inconsistency can be established.
for precisely this result in

to the extent the

intestate

There is, in fact, authority

England.'"

What might be the result when a will is being offered to
probate

and

it

is

shown

to

the

court

that

the testator

had

executed a subsequent will but no evidence as to the contents
of the second instrument is
mere execution

of a second

under the statute?

availab]e?

In

other words, is the

will, without more, a

Probably not.

revocation

Absent any evidence as to

the contents of a lost or destroyed will, the courts will not pre65
sume that the provisions of it were inconsistent with the first.

Therefore, with neither a revocatory clause nor inconsistency
shown, the later will cannot be said to have "declared a revocation" as required

by

the statute.

Hence

the mere execution

of a later will, without more, is not a revocation, leaving prior
C3 Id. at 136, 136 N.E. at 552 (emphasis added).
In the Goods of Hodgkinson, [1893] P. 339. Testator made a first will
giving all his property to one person and appointing her sole executrix.
He then executed a second will, without expressly revoking the first,
devising his real property to another person and appointing that person
sole executrix. Subsequently, he cancelled the later instrument. The
court held that the first will had been partially revoked and granted
probate only to such part of the testator s assets as was not comprised
in the second will and declared intestacy as to the rest. "If the whole
of the first will had been revoked by the second will, it would not
have been revived by the cancellation of the second will; and the same
principle applies to the revocation of part of the first will." Id. at 340.
05! In re Wolfe's Will, 185 N.C. 563, 117 S.E. 804 (1923) (there is no presumption that a later will is inconsistent with an earlier one).
C4
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documents unaffected and still viable. 6 Thus the testator
would be considered testate according to the terms of the

67
latest undestroyed will.

CONCLUSION

The Bailey decision stands in lieu of a statutory revival
statement in Colorado, obviating the need for one in holding
that once a will is revoked by a means provided in the statute
on revocation, it cannot be resurrected except through republication. This holding corresponds to the wisdom of the English
Parliament in the Statute of Wills of 1837 (which continues to
govern in that country today), and it also agrees with the
position taken by at least 12 other jurisdictions in the United
States. More importantly, it is harmonious with the probable
intent of most testators and steadfastly avoids the dangers of
parol evidence in the spirit of the Statute of Frauds.
Bailey also adds substance to the revocation statute in
declaring that the execution of a later will with a revocatory
clause constitutes an immediate and complete revocation of all
prior wills. The revocatory effect of a second will lacking a

clause still awaits resolution. However, the refusal of the Colorado Court of Appeals to impose a technical and literal meaning upon the words of the revocation statute,6" coupled with
the notion that the statute may be interpreted to permit revocaion by implication (or, more specifically, inconsistency is a
"declaration" of revocation), tend to indicate that a will without a revocatory clause might well be considered a statutory
revocation of prior wills to the extent that inconsistency between them can be established.
Thomas L. Roberts

66Eder v. Methodist Ass'n, 94 Colo. 173, 29 P.2d 631 (1934) (a will not
shown to have been revoked in accordance with the statute on revocation must be held to be in existence).
67 See Annotations at note 56 supra listing American cases holding that
the mere execution of a second will does not constitute a revocation.
68 In re McKeown, 28 Colo. App. 49, 470 P.2d 611 (1970).

